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Good Edge, Bad Edge:
How Network Structure Affects a Groupʼs Ability to Coordinate 1
Daniel Enemark,* Mathew McCubbins,* Ramamohan Paturi,‡ and Nicholas Weller§
*University of California, San Diego, Department of Political Science
‡University of California, San Diego, Department of Computer Science and Engineering
§University of Southern California, Department of Political Science and School of International Relations

Coordination is a core concern in social science. Problems as diverse as trying to decide where to
go to dinner, what political candidate to support or which regulatory policy to adopt all contain
coordination as a core element. Most coordination problems arise among actors connected in a
network, and these connections can both improve and impede a group’s ability to achieve
coordination. To model how links influence coordination we distinguish between “constraining
edges” that make coordination harder by reducing the number of equilibrium outcomes, and
“redundant edges” that make coordination easier by merely increasing communication without
affecting the number of equilibria. We show experimentally that the addition of constraining
edges reduces coordination, while redundant edges improve subjects’ ability to solve a
coordination problem.

I. Introduction

Coordination is ubiquitous to human experience. Economists and political scientists study vast
coordination problems involving millions of humans, from the adoption of technological
standards such as computer operating systems to the development of supranational governance
such as the European Union. Often, social scientists use simple, two-person stage games to
model these large-scale coordination problems. The simple coordination game is difficult
because players moving simultaneously are uncertain which of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria
they should aim for. This uncertainty, which arises from lack of information about the other
player’s action, is used as an analogy to explain the difficulty and cost of real-world
coordination.
What goes unrecognized in most analyses is that the various individuals attempting to solve a
coordination problem rarely have equal amounts of information. They are neither uniformly
uninformed, nor are they fully and equally aware of each other’s decisions. In reality, the actors
in most coordination problems are embedded in a network that connects some pairs and not
others. The structure of this network has important consequences for the ability even of perfectly
rational actors to coordinate.
1
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Despite the importance of these networks, little is known about how their structure affects our
ability to solve problems. What features of a network help individuals solve coordination
problems? What features hinder coordination? Observational studies have come to differing
conclusions about the effect of network structure on coordination and cooperation, finding that
network connections can both improve and impede a group’s ability to achieve coordination. We
explain these conflicting findings by distinguishing between two classes of network connections:
those that constrain the number of equilibria to the coordination game, and those that merely
increasing communication without affecting the number of equilibria. We predict that the former
hinders coordination while the latter helps it.
To test our theory, we embed a simple coordination game into networks of varying structure. Our
results demonstrate that the ability of human subjects to solve a coordination problem depends
crucially on the network, because the network constrains the number of equilibria to the game
and defines the amount of communication. In particular, we show that adding “constraining
edges” that eliminate equilibria causes groups to be less successful in solving the coordination
game (even though these edges also increase communication), whereas adding “redundant
edges” that facilitate communication without affecting the number of equilibria causes groups to
be more successful. (Edge is the term in graph theory for the links or connections in a network.)
II. The ubiquity of coordination and networks in politics

Coordination problems are central to politics. This section provides a brief discussion of three
coordination problems prominent in the literature. 2
The importance of coordination and information appears in Weingast’s (1997) model of citizens’
decision to support or revolt against their government. The basic problem is that an individual
citizen is unsure about whether other citizens will also revolt if the government transgresses
individual rights, and it only makes sense to oppose the government if enough others do it as
well. Both of these aspects of the coordination problem are fundamentally about information and
who possesses it. Chwe (2000) studies a very similar model of citizen protest, and focuses
explicitly on the necessary conditions for an information network to lead citizens to coordinate
on protest or not. In Chwe’s model the nodes in the network consists of individuals and the edges
between two nodes signifies that the two individuals know of the others’ decisions.
In electoral politics Cox (1997) discusses how coordination among voters and donors can lead to
outcomes consistent with Duverger’s law. Electoral rules create an incentive for actors to
2
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coordinate on a candidate or candidates to ensure they are able to maximize the probability of
representation in the legislature. Cox’s focus is not explicitly on the network that governs
information spread between individuals, but one can easily imagine that different actors will be
more or less aware of others’ voting intentions or financial contributions and that the overall
structure of this information will influence coordination.
In the policy realm there are a great many issues in which coordination is important and
information networks affect coordination. Policy makers share information among themselves,
which can play a role in the ability to solve coordination problems in a decentralized fashion.
Scholz, Berardo, and Kile (2008) find that cooperation among estuary management organizations
depends on the network in which the organizations operate. Policy actors that are highly
connected to others are more likely to work together on policy implementation, suggesting that
networks influence coordination. Likewise, Carpenter et al. (2004) show that network structure is
both affected by and affects information flow between interest groups attempting to influence
policy making. In particular, they conclude that when demand for information increases lobbying
firms invest more resources in creating strong ties in their network, but that the resulting network
actually impedes the distribution of information. Mintrom and Vergari (1998) find that network
connections facilitate the spread of policy ideas between states. Policy entrepreneurs learn about
policies and then propose similar policies (a form of coordination) based on information from the
networks.
III. An experimental study: distributed graph coloring as a coordination game

We use an experimental adaptation of the Graph Coloring Problem (GCP) to build a better
understanding of how network structure influences the ability of groups to achieve coordination.
The GCP takes a given network (or “graph”) and asks how to color the nodes of the network so
that no two connected nodes share the same color. A coloring that satisfies this condition is called
a proper coloring of the graph, and the minimum number of colors required for a proper coloring
is called the chromatic number of the graph. The GCP is a workhorse problem in computer
science and applied mathematics with applications to difficult allocation problems like air traffic
control (Barnier and Brisset 2004). The GCP is used to model complex phenomena because it is
simple to understand but difficult to solve,3 and these qualities makes it an ideal experimental
task.
Traditionally, the GCP is solved by a centralized algorithm that considers the entire graph and
chooses a color for every node. In our experiments, however, the problem is distributed among
16 subjects, each controlling one node. Each subject can pick among a set of available colors,
and each subject can see only those nodes to which he is connected. Subjects can change colors
as often as they want, but they have only three minutes to find a proper coloring, and they are
only paid if they successfully do so. Following Myerson (1997) and Rasmussen (2006), we view
this as a coordination game, because there are multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria (namely, all
3

The GCP is in the NP-Complete complexity class, meaning that as the size of the input increases the time required
to compute the output increases at a rate faster than any polynomial function of the input.

proper colorings). This experimental adaptation of the GCP was first developed by Kearns et al.
(2006).
Figure 1 shows the interface subjects use to control their nodes. Note that this interface provides
subjects with a few additional pieces of information. Inside each of his neighbors’ node is a
number representing the number of nodes connected to that node, or in graph theory terms, the
node’s degree. At the top of the screen there is a progress bar showing the portion of the network
already solved, and a time bar showing the amount of time remaining. For more information on
the experimental protocol, see Appendix B.
Figure 1. The computer interface subjects use to control the color of their nodes
progress:

88%

elapsed time:

0:35

If the session ends successfully, you will earn $1.00.

2

2
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yellow

IV. Previous experimental findings on networked coordination

Previous studies of coordination in a network have yielded two major conclusions: (1) greater
network connectivity seems to make the game easier to solve, and (2) asymmetric incentives
make the game much harder to solve. Kearns and his colleagues were the first to observe the
relationship between network connectivity and subjects’ ability to solve the problem. They
explain that while adding edges “makes the problem more difficult from the isolated viewpoint
of any individual subject … it apparently makes the collective problem easier by reducing the

number of edges coloring conflicts must travel to be resolved.” That is, information flows faster
through a more connected network.
McCubbins et al. (2008) confirm the connectivity finding, and introduce asymmetric incentives,
an essential aspect of most real-world political and economic coordination problems (Calvert
1992). In their experiments, they identify one of the two colors available to subjects as a “bonus
color,” so that if the problem is solved, subjects with that color will receive an additional
payment on top of the standard pay. This makes the GCP a coordination game with asymmetric
incentives similar to those in the battle of the sexes. Asymmetric incentives drastically reduce
coordination in the lab. (In fact, large enough bonuses prevent coordination entirely.) However,
just as Kearns et al. find that additional edges yield faster solutions, McCubbins et al. find that
asymmetric games are solved more often when connectivity is higher.
McCubbins et al. also find that “when subjects have common, symmetric incentives to
coordinate they can successfully achieve coordination regardless of the network structure.” This
accords with a broader literature showing that experimental subjects easily solve coordination
games with pre-play communication, even when the game requires simultaneous coordination by
many players (see for example Blume and Ortmann, 2007).
As described above, Kearns et al. and McCubbins et al. both argue that increases in the number
of network edges improve coordination. However, neither of these papers studied systematically
the conditions under which additional edges help or hinder network coordination. If we aim to
understand how changes in network structure affect collective outcomes, we need to develop a
more systematic theory of how adding new edges to a network influences the graph-coloring
coordination game. This theory is described below.
V. A theory of constraining and redundant edges

A. The difficulty of finding equilibria
We begin with the simple observation that coordination games—even those with symmetric
incentives—are not always easy. Social scientists tend to focus on relatively simple stage games,
such as the stag hunt, but computer scientists have shown that coordination problems like the
GCP can be an extremely difficult computational problem even from the point of view of a
centralized decision-maker (Khanna, Linial, and Safra, 2000).
In the classic two-player coordination stage game, it is immediately obvious to both players
which outcomes represent successful coordination. Of the four cells in the driving game,
depicted in Figure 2, two represent success (Right, Right and Left, Left). In this game, the search
for equilibria is trivially simple. The challenge is for each player to guess which action the other
will take, and the players can easily solve this problem with a moment of pre-play
communication.

Figure 2. The driving game, a two-player coordination stage game
Right

Left

Right

1, 1

0, 0

Left

0, 0

1, 1

P1\P2

Now consider a 16-player graph-coloring game on a network that can be solved with two colors.
Sixteen subjects each have two choices, so there are 216 cells—65,536 possible outcomes. And
just like the driving game, only two of those outcomes represent success. In this case the search
process represents a serious obstacle to coordination. And that’s only a two-color game; a threecolor game on 16 nodes has 43 million cells, a four-color game 4.3 billion. In these games, the
difficulty is for all subjects to find the same equilibrium. Even with symmetric incentives and
pre-play communication, the distributed search for equilibria hidden among millions of outcomes
makes graph-coloring a challenging coordination problem.
B. Constraining and redundant edges
The players’ distributed search for equilibria becomes more difficult when the number of
equilibria decreases, holding the number of outcomes constant.4 The number of equilibria in the
GCP is determined by the structure of the network. When we add an edge that constrains two
nodes so that they no longer can use the same color, we decrease the number of equilibria. We
call such an edge a “constraining edge,” and each additional constraining edge makes
coordination more difficult.
Not all edges, however, decrease the number of equilibria; if the existing edges in the network
constrain two unconnected nodes so that they are already forced to choose different colors,
adding an edge between those nodes would not decrease the number of solutions to the GCP. We
call this type of edge a “redundant edge,” and it does not make coordination more difficult. In
fact, in our experiments, where each individual can only see the nodes to which he is connected,
adding redundant edges makes coordination easier by increasing the number of nodes the
average subject can see.
To see the effect of network structure on the number of equilibria to the coordination game,
consider the simple network in Figure 3.1, a line with a single added edge. This is a minimallyconstrained connected three-color graph.5 If subjects pick colors in order from left to right,
4
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graph that connects all of n nodes using n – 1 edges (the minimum) is called a “tree.” Since the line, like all
trees, is two-colorable, one extra edge is required to achieve the minimally-constrained connected three-color graph.

Figure 3.1. A minimally-constrained connected three-color network

Figure 3.2. A maximally-constrained three-color network

Figure 3.3. The maximally-connected three-color network

The edges in graph 3.2 are a superset of those in graph 3.1;
the edges in graph 3.3 are a superset of those in 3.2.
The bold edges are those existing in the previous graph.

and each subject is given three colors from which to choose, then the leftmost node can pick any
one of the three colors, the next can pick either of the two remaining colors, and the third node
must pick the one color unused by the first two. The rest of the 13 nodes can choose either one
of the two colors not chosen by the preceding node. The number of solutions to the GCP on this
network is 3 × 2 × 1 × 213, or 49,152.
If we add a constraining edge between the second and fourth nodes of the graph in figure 3.1, the
number of choices available to the fourth node decreases from 2 to 1, reducing the number of
solutions from 49,152 to 24,576. We can continue adding constraining edges between all paris of
nodes vi and vi+2, reducing the number of solutions by half with each new edge, until we arrive at
the graph in figure 3.2, a line of tessellated triangles, for which there are only six solutions. This
is a maximally-constrained three-color graph; a three-color network can have no fewer than six
solutions because there are six permutations of three colors. (Graph theorists call these graphs
uniquely-colorable, because without isometric permutations, there is only one solution.)
Finally, starting with a maximally-constrained network like the one in figure 3.2, we can add
redundant edges between any two nodes of a different color.6 These edges are “redundant”
because they do not affect the conditions required to solve the coordination problem. In our
experiments, where the network also defines the information available to each node, adding
redundant edges gives subjects more information about each other’s actions.
VI. Hypotheses

We derive two hypotheses from our theory of constraining and redundant edges.
H1: Graphs with more constraining edges will be harder for experimental subjects to solve.
H2: Graphs with more redundant edges, holding the level of constraint constant,
will be easier for our subjects to solve.
We measure how “hard” or “easy” it is for subjects to solve coordination problems by the
frequency with which they find solutions before a three-minute time limit expires. Harder
networks are those solved less frequently, while easier networks are those solved more
frequently. Because our subjects are only paid for solving the problems they’re given, we can be
confident they are motivated to find solutions, and if they fail to solve the problem, it is because
the problem is difficult, and not for lack of effort. The results for our frequency measure are
shown in Figures 4 and 5.
There is, of course, a probabilistic element to the task. After all, it is possible that if each subject
chose a color at random, the outcome would be a solution to the GCP (though the probability of
this is less than 1% even for the simplest network we run, as opposed to 50% for the standard 2person coordination stage game). In addition to the randomness inherent in the task, individual
6 A network

needn’t be maximally constrained in order to add a redundant edge, but if a network is maximally
constrained, all edges that don’t increase chromatic number are redundant.

human behavior is quite unpredictable, and group behavior even more so. Thus we expect to find
that some graphs are solved more frequently than others, and not that one half are always solved
while the other half are always unsolved.
We also suspect that easier graphs are solved more quickly and harder graphs more slowly,
because we believe subjects are motivated to solve problems as quickly as possible. Subjects
should attempt to complete problems quickly for two reasons: First, if there is a risk that they
will not complete the task within the three-minute deadline, they should work toward a solution
as quickly as possible. Second, subjects simply value their own time. We do not, however, create
any explicit, controlled incentives for solving problems quickly. In future work we plan to
incentivize time-to-completion, and compare the results with the data from this round of
experiments, so that we can be confident that our subjects are already attempting to complete
problems quickly without explicit incentives. We do, however, present graphs of average time to
completion in Appendix A, and these graphs corroborate the results in Figures 4 and 5.
VII. The Experimental Test

Our experiments use a within-subjects design, in which a group of 16 subjects attempts to solve
distributed GCPs 30-40 times, with varying networks. The treatments are 29 different three- and
four-color networks, and the unit of analysis is the group of 16 subjects. Each group received
every treatments at least once, and the order of treatments was randomized.
To develop the networks used as the treatments, we had to use graphs requiring more than two
colors, because every connected two-colorable graph is maximally constrained and therefore has
no room for additional constraining edges. This was a simple but important improvement over
previous work that focused on two-colorable graphs and thus overlooked the effect of
constraining edges. Therefore, we began with the least-constrained connected three-color graph
(shown in Figure 3.1). We then added constraining edges, two at a time, decreasing the number
of solutions so that each successive graph yields 1/4 the number of solutions of the preceding
graph. We added these edges until we arrived at the minimally-connected maximally-constrained
graph (shown in Figure 3.2), a tessellated line of triangles.
We then added redundant edges to the maximally-constrained graph. These edges do not change
the number of solutions to the GCP, but they do increase the amount of information available to
the players. We first connected the ends of the tessellated line to form a ring-lattice of triangles,
and then added redundant edges, approximately 16 at a time, until we reached the maximallyconnected three-color graph. At this point no more edges could be added without violating threecolorability.
The process of adding constraining and then redundant edges yielded 12 three-color graphs,
shown in Appendix B, Figure 9.1. We used the same method to generate four-color graphs,
which use tetrahedrons instead of triangles to constrain players to the use of four colors. This
yielded 17 four-color graphs, shown in Appendix B, Figure 9.2.

VII. Results7

The results of our experiments confirm both of our hypotheses: constraining edges clearly hinder
coordination, and redundant edges clearly help it. In fact, successful coordination depends
crucially on the number of constraining and redundant edges in the network connecting players.
At the minimum number of constraining edges, both three- and four-colorable graphs were
solved in every trial. With the addition of more constraining edges, success rates dropped
precipitously, and without redundant edges, subjects were completely unable to solve maximallyconstrained graphs of either three or four colors.
Figure 4 displays along the x-axis the number of constraining edges in a network and along the
y-axis the proportion of networks solved. As we move from left to right along the x-axis, each
additional edge reduces the number of equilibria. As we predicted, increases in the number of
constraining edges cause groups to be less successful at solving the coordination problem. (For
both 3 and 4 colorable graphs once we move beyond the addition of a few non-redundant edges
we observe a dramatic decline in the proportion of networks solved. This demonstrates quite
dramatically how changing network structure by adding edges can impede coordination.
Perhaps the most impressive result, however, is that redundant edges can make an otherwise
unsolvable problem tractable. Adding these edges does not change the actions, outcomes,
incentives, or equilibria of the game; it simply increases the amount of information available to
actors. Nonetheless, the frequency with which subjects solved maximally-constrained graphs
rose sharply with the addition of redundant edges.
Figure 5 displays the proportion of coordination problems that are successfully solved as we add
redundant edges to the fully-constrained three and four colorable networks. With the addition of
only a few redundant edges (3 in a three-colorable graph and 6 in a four-colorable graph)
networks that were previously unsolvable for subjects become solvable. With the full
compliment of redundant edges, the maximally-constrained three-color graph was solved every
time. Even the maximally-constrained four-color graph was solved in 85% of trials when all 52
redundant edges were added. This results shows that redundant edges facilitate coordination even
when we start with the most difficult coordination problem possible for a given chromatic
number.
Figure 6 shows logit coefficients for the effect of constraining and redundant edges, showing that
these effects are significant at the .001 level.

7
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Figure 4. Constraining edges make coordination harder
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Figure 5. Redundant edges make coordination easier, holding the number of equilibria constant
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Figure 6. Logistic regressions confirm that the effects shown in Figures 4 and 5 are significant
Likelihood of Solution
3-color graphs

4-color graphs

Effect of constraining edges

-.357***
(.112)
n = 46

-.296***
(.0634)
n = 77

Effect of redundant edges

.0905**
(.0322)
n = 32

.0943**
(.0315)
n = 31

Note: Entries are logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
** p < .005 *** p < .001

VII. Conclusions

To understand large-scale coordination problems, it is essential to consider the network that
connects the individuals attempting to coordinate. Our experiments demonstrate that too many
constraining connections between players can make coordination infeasible. At the same time,
enough redundant edges can make even the hardest problems solvable given a reasonable
timeframe.
These findings demonstrate the fundamental point that a network can do two very important
things: define the constraints that must be satisfied in order to solve a problem, and facilitate the
flow of information. Because a new edge may introduce additional constraints, building more
connections may actually impede the ability of a group to coordinate. On the other hand, the free
flow of information can help solve an otherwise intractable problem.
Previous work has found that increases in the number of connections helped coordination in both
symmetric (Kearns et al. 2006) and asymmetric (McCubbins et al. 2009) games. At first blush
these results appear contradictory to our finding that additional edges may impede coordination.
This only happens, however, when the new edge constrains the number of equilibria to the
coordination game. Because the prior experiments primarily used two-color graphs, and all
connected two-color graphs are maximally constrained, these experiments essentially held
constraint constant while adding redundant edges. The results from these prior experiments are
perfectly consistent with our second hypothesis, that adding redundant edges makes coordination
easier. The primary contribution of this paper is to make the theoretical distinction between
constraining and redundant edges, and to systematically study how these different types of edges
influence coordination.

Expanding the European Union
We end with a brief description of a networked coordination problem in politics. This example
shows that networks are an important component of real-world coordination. It also suggests
more generally that recognizing the difference between constraining and redundant edges can
help us to understand important problems in social science.
The members of the European Union use their shared political institutions to address a multitude
of coordination problems, such as the regulation of industry, monetary policy, and social policy.
Each time a new state joins the EU it creates links between the new state and existing members.
As we demonstrate in this paper, the addition of a constraining edges to a network makes
coordination more difficult. Thus real-world political actors who value coordination are likely to
avoid the addition of constraining edges. Nonetheless, adding new connections between
European states can create immense value by enabling inexpensive communication, which helps
solve future coordination problems. This feature is analogous to the beneficial effect of network
connections in our experiments; it helps individual nodes share information and find equilibria.
The EU avoids adding constraining edges by requiring applicant states to adopt a host of policies
designed to align them with the EU’s existing equilibrium, turning what would have been a
constraining edge into a redundant one. The EU requires that applicants bring their “institutions,
management capacity and administrative and judicial systems up to Union standards … with a
view to implementing the acquis … effectively in good time before accession” (European
Commission, 2005). (The acquis is the full body of existing EU law, an evolving response to the
problem of international policy coordination.) The EU can make these strong demands because
membership is highly valued, so it can be used as a carrot for inducing applicants to harmonize
their policies with existing members.
If a state can manage to adopt all of the required domestic changes, this suggests that the link
formed by a new state’s membership will be a redundant link that does not complicate
coordination. The possibility of a new state making coordination more difficult increases if the
new country is significantly different than the countries currently in the EU. The current efforts
to make Turkey comply with EU standards can be understood as an attempt to ensure that
Turkey's membership does not complicate policy coordination in the Union.
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Appendix A: Time-to-Completion Data

As discussed in the body of the paper, subjects are not explicitly incentivized to solve
problems quickly, but we believe they are attempting to solve them quickly to avoid the
risk of failure and because they value their own time. Figures 7 and 8 show that adding
constraining edges increases mean time-to-completion, and adding redundant edges
decreases mean time-to-completion, corroborating the results in Section VII.
Figure 7. Constraining edges make coordination harder
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Figure 8. Redundant edges make coordination easier, holding the number of equilibria constant
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Appendix B: Experimental Procedure

In all of the experiments reported in this paper the networks consisted of 16 nodes/
subjects. After subjects reported to the experiment they were placed at a computer behind
partitions so that they could not see the other participants. Before the experiment began
we read aloud the directions to all the subjects in the room to ensure that the procedures,
rules, and incentives are all common knowledge. In addition, all subjects take a short quiz
(with payment for correct answers) to make sure they understand the experiment.
To ensure that subjects did not repeatedly choose the same color over and over again
(thereby possibly facilitating coordination), we used a palate of 10 colors and for each
coordination game a subject was randomly given the minimum number of needed colors
from a palate of ten possible colors. In addition, subjects in a given game chose from
different colors to ensure that if they were able to see another’s monitor the subject could
not learn anything about how that subject was acting. The central server presented each
subject’s terminal with the number of colors utilized for a given network (equal to that
network’s chromatic number). The information displayed on each computer was
controlled by our central server that utilized a software program developed and shared by
Michael Kearns and Stephen Judd at the University of Pennsylvania.
We conducted experiments with five different groups of 16 subjects. We collected data
from 179 different attempts to solve the graph coloring problem. Of those 179 attempts,
75 trials involved three-color graphs and 104 involved four-color graphs. The payment
for coordination was $1 per subject and groups had three minutes to achieve
coordination. Each experimental trial ends either when the time limit is reached or the
group achieves coordination successfully, and this is known to all subjects in the
experiment.
In the experiment each subject controls the color of one node in the network so
coordination is the result of distributed actions. However, subjects do have more
information than just the color of their own node. The screen that subjects saw during the
experiment contained the following information.
• Local View: Subjects are able to see their node and the neighboring nodes to
which they are connected. Each node in their local neighborhood contains a
number in its center that tells the subject how many total edges a neighboring
node has. This allows them to see the color they have chosen for their node as
well as the colors chosen by their neighbors
• Color choices: subjects can see the three or four colors from which they can
choose

• Elapsed Time Bar: This bar kept track of the amount of time since the session
began, and allows subjects to determine how much time is remaining before the
time limit.
• Completion Percentage Bar: This bar provides information about how close the
entire network is to completion. The percent completed represents the number of
edges without a coloring conflict divided by the total number of edges in the
graph.
During the actual experiment the bars for elapsed time and completion percentage are
updated in real time. Figure 1 displays a typical screen shot that a subject sees before the
experiment begins. By looking at the screen a subject with this picture can determine that
he is connected to three nodes and that one of those nodes has eight total edges (and the
other two nodes each have three total edges. The subject can also see that he can choose
between pink and violet during this session. During the experiment subjects continue to
see this screen shot, but the progress bar and elapsed time bars change to reflect the
global condition of the network.
The screen shot shows that although subjects have a tremendous amount of information
available to them during the experiment, they do not know the structure of the entire
network nor do they know who their geographic neighbors are in the experiment. In
addition, subjects are assigned to their node randomly at the beginning of each session
within a given experiment. Therefore, even if they discover to whom they are connected
in a given session that will only last for one session. This procedure ensures subjects do
not always occupy the same position in a network when we repeat network structures
with different bonus parameters. Because subjects do not know the entire structure of the
network they are not able to learn anything about how their choices relate to the group’s
success or failure for a given network type.
Figures 9.1 and 9.2 show the three- and four-color graphs, respectively, used in our study.

Figure 9.1. Three-color graphs

Figure 9.2 Four-color graphs

